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Bartholow: Charitable Immunity - Status of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine

CHARITABLE IMMUNITY-Status of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine in
Wyoming. Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of America v. Yepsen,
469 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1970).

Plaintiff's husband was treated in a hospital owned by
the defendant, Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of
America, for a puncture wound on his thigh. Thereafter he
died. The plaintiff, as administratrix of her husband's estate,
instituted an action against the hospital. The complaint alleged that the death was caused by gas gangrene resulting
from the negligence of the defendant or its employees. The
defendant was granted a separate trial solely to determine the
availability of either charitable or governmental immunity
to insulate itself from liability. The plaintiff presented evidence regarding substantial payments to the hospital from
governmental agencies for treatment rendered charity patients. The plaintiff further demonstrated that Lutheran
Hospitals and Homes Society of America generally charged
its patients for services and that such charges were made in
connection with the treatment rendered plaintiff's husband.
The defendant presented evidence of an arrangement whereby
it leased the hospital building and equipment from the Board
of Trustees of Washakie County Memorial Hospital, a governmental unit. The trial court held that the doctrines of charitable and governmental immunity were inapplicable to the
defendant. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the charitable
nature of the hospital was insufficient to immunize the defendant from liability and that governmental immunity was not
available to a lessee of a governmental agency.'
The first case in the United States to hold that charities
were immune from liability in tort was McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital. This early exception of charities
from liability was based on the theory that the charity's assets
constituted a trust fund and should not be used to pay damage
claims because such a use was not intended by the donors of
the fund. Later decisions by other courts added different
1. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409 (Wyo.

1970).

2. 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. R. 529 (1876).
3. Id. at 436, 21 Am. R. at 532.
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rationale upon which to base charitable immunity. Charitable
immunity has been based on the theory that the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to charities because they do
not receive any benefit from the acts of their employees.'
Another theory upon which courts have relied in holding that
charities are imnune in tort is that of implied waiver.5 The
idea of implied waiver is that when a person accepts the benefit of a charity he impliedly waives his right to sue the
charity. Still other courts have relied on the theory that public policy favors charitable immunity.' It is thought that public policy favors charitable donations and that the public will
be more likely to make such donations if charities are immune
from tort liability.
In adopting the doctrine of charitable immunity, the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Bishop Randall Hospitalv. Hartley7 based its decision on all of the above stated rationale except the public policy theory. The holding in Hartley was
that, in the absence of negligence in the selection of its employees, the hospital, as a charitable institution, was not liable
for torts committed by its employees. The fact that the hospital charged those who could pay for the services it rendered
did not affect its status as a charity The controlling facts
in characterizing the hospital as a charitable institution were
that a large portion of the operating expenses were acquired
through donations and that treatment was given gratuitously
to those who could not pay.'
The applicability of the doctrine of charitable immunity,
as adopted in Hartley, has now been restricted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in the case of Lutheran Hospitals and
Homes Society of America v. Yepsen.1 Recognizing that the
4. E.g., Southern Methodist Hosp. & Sanitorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46
P.2d 118, 125 (1935) ; Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W.
577, 582 (1921).
5. E.g., Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82
P.2d 849, 854 (1938); Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitorium & Benevolent Ass'n,
92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W. 1120 (1912).
6. E.g., Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E.
287, 291 (1922) ; Weston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va.
587, 107 S.E. 785, 792 (1921).
7. 24 Wyo. 408, 414, 160 P. 385, 386 (1916).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 413-14, 160 P. at 386.
10. 469 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1970).
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doctrine of charitable immunity was a judicial creation, the
court reasoned that the doctrine could be judicially restricted." The court in Yepsen decided that the hospital was
not in fact a charity. Lutheran Hospital was found to differ
from Bishop Randall Hospital in that a large portion of Lutheran's operating fund was derived from paying patients."
Another difference between the hospitals was that Bishop
Randall Hospital rendered treatment gratuitously to those who
could not pay, whereas Lutheran Hospital was substantially
reimbursed by govermnental agencies in similar situations. 3
In further support of its decision, the Wyoming Supreme
Court viewed recent Wyoming legislation as indicating an intent to limit the advantages given charities to those which are
truly charitable in nature. 4 The differences in the methods of
financing the two hospitals and the recent legislation were
relied upon by the court in concluding that Hartley did not
control its decision in Yepsen. Hartley continues to be precedent for the doctrine of charitable immunity but is limited in
its applicability to institutions which are truly charitable in
character. It might be argued that no organization can be
characterized as truly charitable if it is true, as some courts
have found, that modern charities are big businesses. 5
Although the court in Yepsen did not directly question
the wisdom of continued adherence to the doctrine of charitable immunity, the decision does shed some doubt on the
strength of at least one of the rationale which has supported
the doctrine in Wyoming. Continued reliance on the trust
fund theory is certainly in doubt as a result of the court's
statement that "institutions such as the Lutheran society can
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.

Id.
WYo. STAT. § 15.1-4 (1957) authorizes cities and towns to purchase liability insurance. It also provides that to the extent of insurance coverage,
the city's immunity is waived. WYO. STAT. § 33.343.1 (Supp. 1971) provides
that a doctor or other person who, in good faith, renders aid at the scene
of an emergency is only liable if charges are made for services rendered.

WYO. STAT. § 39-10 (1957) limits the exemption of property owned by
charities from property tax to those cases where the property is not used
primarily for commercial purposes. The court in Yepsen cited and discussed
these statutes. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen,
supra note 10, at 411.
15. E.g., Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1960);
President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
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and do carry liability insurance to a far greater extent than
was done in 1916. Thus, there is less reason for a rule of immunity... than there was in 1916. "" This same argument has
been advanced by other courts to discredit the trust fund
theory while totally abolishing the charitable immunity doctrine. 7 Although not touched upon in Yepsen, arguments of
equal merit have been put forward by courts in discrediting
the other traditional rationale which have supported the doctrine of charitable immunity."8
The statement regarding the availability of liability insurance is important in at least one other sense. It demonstrates the possibility that the court will go at least as far in
restricting the charitable immunity doctrine as the legislature
has gone in restricting governmental immunity. The legislature has authorzed cities and towns to purchase liability insurance and has further provided that by purchasing insurance
immunity is waived to the extent of coverage."9 This is not to
say that liability under Yepsen is necessarily contingent upon
the existence of insurance. Although some courts have conditioned liability of charities on insurance,' such is not true
of the decision in Yepsen. Courts which have so conditioned
liability of charities were deciding whether to make charities
liable. These courts were not considering the question presented in Yepsen of whether the institution was in fact a
charity. Once it is determined that the institution is not a
charity as in Yepsen, the institution is in the same position as
any other private litigant.
16. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen, supra note 10, at
411-12.
17. E.g., President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra note 15,
at 823.
18. The inconsistency in the theory that the doctrine of respondeat-superior
does not apply to charities is apparent from the fact that courts have
applied the doctrine when the plaintiff is a stranger, but not when he is
a beneficiary. Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220,
227 (1951). The implied waiver theory clearly fails where the beneficiary
is a minor or is unconscious and unable to enter into a binding legal
agreement. Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d
485, 491 (1967). The court in Rabon discussed the public policy theory and
found that public policy favored holding charities liable in order to force
them to exercise care in rendering their services. Id. at 493.
19. Wyo. STAT. § 15.1-4 (1957).
20. E.g., Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966); Cox v. De
Jarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961); Wendt v. Servite
Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342 (1947).
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Yepsen's expansive language potentially makes it applicable to all private hospitals as well as all other institutions
which are operated and financed in a manner similar to the
defendant's. The test applied by both the district court and
the supreme court limited the designation of "charitable institution" to those which are not operated in any form for profit,
gain or financial advantage.2 1 As stated, the test is basically
one of degree. Various factors must be considered in determining whether the institution is in fact charitable. Among
the factors to be considered, as stated in Rabou v. Rowan
Memorial Hospital Inc.2 2 (cited by the court in Yepsen 2 ), is
whether the institution makes every effort to operate at a
profit. Relevant to this factor would be the extent to which
payments received for services contribute to the operating
fund of the institution.2 4 Other factors to consider would include the amount of unreimbursed services which the organization renders and the number of bad debts written off as uncollectable. s5 These criteria do not impose an absolute standard but do provide a yardstick for determining whether an
institution is charitable in nature.
The decision in Yepsen leaves somewhat unclear the
effect upon immunity resulting from an otherwise charitable
institution charging for its services. This ambiguity is caused
by the court's statement that
[t]he fact that charges are generally made and were
in fact made in connection with Gall's [plaintiff's
husband] treatment needs to be viewed in the light of
legislative tendencies, since 1916, to limit benefits bestowed upon charities to instances where charges are
not made and where compensation is not received."
21. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v.
410.
22. 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485, 499 (1967).
23. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v.
412.
24. Hodgson v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 Mich.
(1964).
25. Id.
26. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v.
412.
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It might be argued that the court was limiting the liability of
institutions such as the Lutheran Hospital to only those patients who have paid for their services. The court cited a recent statute which tends to reinforce this argument. The statute cited was section 33-343.1 of the Wyoming Statutes which
exempts a doctor from liability for negligence if he renders
aid at an emergency without compensation. That liability was
not, however, dependent upon payment in Yepsen would appear to be shown by the district court's finding with which
the Wyoming Supreme Court agreed:
that defendant-society rendered such a minute
amount of service on a 'free' or 'charity' basis, in
comparison with those cases where charges are made
and payment is expected, that the charity nature of
the institution was insufficient to give the defendant
the immunity it seeks. 7
Charging for treatment is relevant to the question whether
the institution is a charity. As was stated previously, once it
is determined that the institution is not charitable, it is in
the same position as any other private litigant.
The holding in Yepsen left unaffected hospitals which, as
governmental units, are protected from liability by the doctrine of governmental immunity. Bondurant v. Board of
Trustees of the Memorial Hospital,28 held that the maintenance of a hospital by a county was a governmental function
and therefore the hospital was inmmune from liability. The
court in Yepsen noted that the doctrine of governmental
immunity creates inequities but expressed the opinion that
the legislature should overrule it. 9 Yepsen, however, did
hold that governmental immunity was not available to the
lessee of a government unit."
Although other courts in abolishing or restricting the
charitable immunity doctrine have limited their decisions to
prospective effect,"' the Wyoming Supreme Court apparently
27. Id. at 410.
28. 354 P.2d 219, 222 (Wyo. 1960).
29. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of America v. Yepsen, supra note 10, at
410.
80. Id. at 412.
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has not done so in Yepsen. Prospective holdings only affect
causes of action which arise subsequent to their decision. The
basic reason for denying retroactive effect to decisions is to
protect parties who justifiably relied on the status of the law
prior to the decision. 2 This rationale is applicable to charitable immunity cases because charities which have relied on
immunity probably are not protected by liability insurance.
The court in Yepsen may have refused to limit the effect of
its decision believing that no charity could justifiably rely on
immunity, given the number of other states which have
abolished the doctrine. The general rule is that decisions
should have retroactive as well as prospective effect." Departure from this rule should only be made when it is necessary to protect one who justifiably relied on the old law.
There appears to be at least one other possible explanation
for the court's failure to limit the applicability of Yepsen.
A recent Missouri case refused to dismiss a claim against a
hospital which arose prior to the decision which abolished the
doctrine prospectively. 4 The court held that the plaintiff
could introduce evidence to prove that the hospital was not
in fact a charity at the time of the injury. It was further
held that such a determination was not foreclosed by the
earlier prospective holding. Yepsen could likewise be interpreted as a factual determination, in which case it would not
have been necessary to limit its applicability. The question
of whether the Wyoming Supreme Court was right or wrong
in not limiting its decision in Yepsen is only of academic
importance. The statute of limitations for such actions is
only one year and has now foreclosed any cause of action
which arose prior to Yepsen."
The doctrine of charitable immunity is still in existence
in Wyoming. In its present state, the doctrine is applicable
31. E.g., Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485,
499 (1967); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 106 N.W.2d 1, 14-16
(1960).
82. Note, Where the Defense of Charitable Immunity Has Been Abolished Prospectively It Will Also Be Applied Retroactively When the Charity I
Covered By Liability Insurance, 7, HOUSTON L. REv. 394, 395 (1970).
33. Id.
34. Clark v. Faith Hospital Ass'n, 472 S.W.2d 375 (Me. 1971).
35. WYo. STAT. § 1-19 (1957).
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to institutions which are truly charitable unless they are guilty
of institutional negligence. In its reference to the availability
of insurance to charities, the court demonstrated its discontent with the doctrine of charitable immunity. Charities
might be well advised to purchase liability insurance to protect themselves in the event the court further limits or
abolishes the doctrine of charitable immunity in the future.
STEVEN A. BARTHOLOW
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